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The Use of Formal and Informal Organizational Structures in Chuikov’s 62nd/8th Guards Army

Pictured: Lieutenant-General V.I. Chuikov, 1942.


(It has been a few months since I last crafted a blog entry, and during this brief hiatus, I have experienced some significant work and life changes. However, I am delighted to be writing again and look forward to sharing more thoughts and research as time allows. I hope you enjoy!)


Building upon a previous blog entry where I explored flattening the hierarchical structure of the 62nd/8th Guards Army, another way to frame the structure Chuikov’s army is through the use of formal and informal structures. It is possible for an organization to utilize both formal and informal structures successfully, and the 62nd/8th Guards Army is a prime example of how this works.


A formal structure is one based on a recognized hierarchy, following a chain of command as one might typically find in the military. While there are advantages to this formality, there are some genuine challenges as well. Chidiebere Chibuike revealed that formal organizational structures are hierarchical, with clear lines of authority and communication, and are typically used in larger organizations with complex operations. They provide clarity and stability but can be rigid.


Chibuike continued the comparison by examining informal organizational structures, which are decentralized with fluid relationships and communication patterns, often found in smaller organizations or within teams in larger organizations. They are flexible and adaptable, fostering camaraderie and innovation, but can be unclear and inefficient, making it hard to know where to seek guidance or support. 


As one can surmise, moving fluidly from formal to informal structures requires a balance of excellent communication and team member empowerment; an organization-wide understanding of the strategical, tactical, and operational direction; and the willingness of leaders and team members alike to utilize a shared leadership model. Marisa Sanfilippo recently wrote an article on this leadership model, where she stated the following:


“Shared leadership is more of a collaborative effort. One person is still in charge, but power and influence are shared within the group. This could mean individuals have more autonomy over decisions related to their positions or an open-door policy where everyone’s ideas are given fair consideration.”


A significant hindrance to a shared leadership model is micromanagement, which is described as a managerial behavior characterized by excessive supervision and control over employees' work and processes, coupled with minimal delegation of tasks or decision-making authority to staff. Bilyana Petrova asserted that micromanagement occurs due to “fear of failure, extreme need for control and domination, inexperience in management, insecurities, unskilled team members, unhealthy ego, etc.” Some micromanagers may be driven to act obsessively due to issues in their personal lives. However, the most common reason for micromanagement is a lack of trust and respect for their team members.


On to Chuikov’s leadership of the 62nd/8th Guards Army… The situation in Stalingrad in 1942/1943 was indeed a dire one—a scenario where Vasily Ivanovich and his staff needed to utilize a variety of tactics and operations to achieve the overall strategy of holding the city at all costs. He had to employ a high level of trust in his junior officers and their military units to achieve their goal despite insurmountable odds and constant enemy bombardment. In addition, Marshal Chuikov wrote copiously about using small assault ‘storm (or sturm) groups’ to constantly counterattack and keep the Germans off balance. Vasily Ivanovich describes this in his book The Battle for Stalingrad:


The soldier in a storm group must have initiative and boldness, must rely on himself alone and believe in his own powers. No one else can carry out his job for him; his comrades have got enough of their own to do… In an assault, he is very often left to his own devices, acts alone, on his own responsibility. Clearly, to wait and look around for one's comrades is letting them down, not helping them. Once you are inside the house it is too late to ask the commander to repeat his explanations of what you have to do.”


Moreover, the use of snipers in the ruins of Stalingrad struck fear in the enemy. Edwin Hoyt, author of 199 Days: The Battle for Stalingrad, included Chuikov’s philosophy on urban warfare—“Every German soldier must be made to feel that he is living under the muzzle of a Russian gun.” To achieve this, it was crucial for snipers to act independently and with stealth. Wartime footage from Stalingrad showed Soviet snipers from within the rubble, actively picking off the enemy and instilling fear and anguish in their prey.


In conclusion, Chuikov’s leadership of the 62nd/8th Guards Army during the Battle of Stalingrad highlights the effective use of both formal and informal structures. Despite the rigidity of military hierarchy, Vasily Ivanovich actively empowered junior officers and promoted initiative among soldiers. This blend of structured command with flexible, autonomous units like storm groups and snipers proved crucial in responding to challenging battlefield conditions. By employing a shared leadership model, Chuikov emphasized trust and minimized micromanagement, demonstrating how adaptable leadership and the integration of different organizational structures can achieve success in high-stakes situations.

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